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1 Introduction 
 This paper presents a model that fits well with the recent evolution of electronic commerce. 
 The development of the Internet allowed the creation of a new retailing technology: e-commerce. Initially, 
the creation of new markets suggested a big growth potential. Between January 1998 and July 2000, venture capital 
invested $65 billion in Internet companies (Fortune, October 30, 2000). In spite of all this investment euphoria, firms 
generated very small revenues. One reason was that firms deliberately charged very low prices, justifying their 
behavior by saying that they where investing in Consumer Acquisition, which suggests the existence of switching 
costs1. After the fall of the NASDAQ in April 2000, capital markets closed for most Net companies, which then 
faced one of three options: survive on their own revenues, often minimal, sell out, or go bankrupt. In either case, a 
wave of consolidation started, and it is expected that of the large number of entrants, few will survive.  
 To explain this process, I’m going to develop a model, which is a special case of Pereira (2001), and is related 
to Reinganum (1979) and Fishman & Rob (1995), where there are 2 distinct phases. First, a phase where there is a 
build up in the number of firms and intense price competition, and second, a phase where there is a shakeout. The 
driving forces of this process are: Cost Uncertainty, and Switching costs2. Regarding cost uncertainty, e-commerce 
allows costs savings, compared to physical shop retailing. But since the technology is new, achieving these cost 
reductions is uncertain, and firms only learn over time, by producing, if they succeeded. I also assume, that a firm that 
initially has low costs, is more likely to have low costs latter, than a firm that initially has high costs. Regarding 
switching costs, e-commerce reduces search and switching costs, compared with physical shop retailing, but it does 
not eliminate them. Browsing Web sites is not costless, and it is easier to learn the current price of a previous 
supplier, than the price of another firm. Internet shoppers can be e-mailed price updates by their current vendor, while 
they have to search to learn the price of a new firm. Opening and account with a Web merchant, also creates a 
switching cost. Amazon tried to patent the “one click shopping”. Thus, since there are switching costs that lock-in 
consumers, Internet firms are prepared to initially charge low prices to build a customer base for the future, where 
they hope to have low costs. If, however, firms fail to reduce costs, they exit the industry. 
                                                 
1 See Hoffman & Novak (2000). 
2 Switching cost is a one-time product specific cost, a consumer must bare in order to consume a product, e.g., learning to use a word processor, or finding a new store (for more 
examples see Beggs & Klemperer (1992) and the references therein). 
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 Since search is costly, consumers accept prices above the minimum charged in the market. This gives firms 
market power3. Switching costs lock-in consumers to their period 1 suppliers. With the prospect of buying twice from 
the same firm, since period 1’s production costs are correlated with period 2’s costs, in period 1 consumers conduct a 
more thorough search than they would for a single purchase, i.e., in period 1 they hold a lower reservation price than 
in the period 2. 
 Since low cost firms charge the lowest price, they are not constrained by consumer search, and charge their 
monopoly price. High cost firms may also benefit from the market power generated by costly search. If the 
reservation price is higher than marginal cost, they charge the reservation price. If the reservation price is lower than 
marginal cost, in period 2 they exit the industry; but in period 1, due to the lock-in effect, they remain active to secure 
a larger consumer share in period 2. 
 Over time, prices increase if no exit occurs, and decrease if exit occurs. 
 These results contrast with the switching costs literature (see Klemperer (1992) for a survey), where 
typically emerges a pattern of price cuts followed by price hikes. In my model, although consumers have a switching 
cost, prices need not increase over time. And when they do, it is not because the consumers’ reservation prices 
increase over time, not because firms exploit their locked-in consumers in period 2. 
 In new industries, a building up in the number of firms followed by a shakeout is a well-documented 
phenomenon (Klepper & Simons (1999,1997))4.In the case of Internet technologies, parallel to the cycle of entry and 
shakeout, there was also a cycle of boom and burst in the stock market. That was also the case of railroads in the 
late 19th, century and the case of electricity in the early 20th century. Are these 2 cycles related? In case of Internet 
technologies, once the stock market boom started, the initial public offerings gave firms access to virtually free 
capital, which fuelled the entry cycle. However, why does the emergence of a new technology generate a stock 
market boom? 
 In section 2 I present the model, in section 3 I characterize its equilibria, in section 4 I conduct its analysis, 
and in section 5 I discuss some generalizations. Proofs are in the Appendix. 
                                                 
3 The ability to raise price above marginal cost. 
4 See Ericsson & Pakes (1995), Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic (1982) and Lippman & Rumelt (1982), for models of industry evolution. 
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2 The Model 
 In this section I present the model, which is very simple to convey the paper’s main ideas as clearly as 
possible. In Section 5 I point out several generalizations analyzed in Pereira (2001). 
 
(a) The Setting 
 Consider a market of a perishable homogeneous good that opens 2 periods. Subscript t refers to time. 
 Each of the game’s 2 periods is composed of 2 stages. In each period, in stage 1 firms choose prices, and in 
stage 2 consumers search for prices. Then agents receive their period payoffs. 
 
(b) Consumers 
 There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral identical consumers. A consumer who buys at price p 
demands   D( p) , where   D(.)  is a twice differentiable, bounded function, with a bounded inverse, and decreasing in p. 
The surplus of a consumer who pays p is 
  
S( p):= D(t)dt
p
¥
ò . 
 Consumers do not know the prices charged by individual firms. However, they hold common beliefs about the 
price distribution. Cumulative distribution function,   Ft(.) , gives the consumers' beliefs about the (unconditional) period 
t price distribution; the lowest and highest prices on its support are 
  
p
t
 and   p t ;   H(.|q)  gives the consumers’ beliefs 
about the price that a firm that charged q in period 1, charges in period 2. 
 To observe a price a consumer must pay a constant amount, the search cost: 
  
s Î 0,+¥( ). Within each 
period search is sequential, instantaneous, a consumer may observe any number of prices, and may at any time 
accept any offer received to date. In each search session a consumer picks randomly which firm to sample, from the 
set of firms whose current price he does not know. In period 2, a consumer learns for free (only) the current price of 
his period 1 supplier. This creates a Switching Cost, equal to the expected search expenditure. 
 A consumer's information set just after his k-th search (or return) step, consists of all previously observed 
prices. A consumer’s strategy for stage 2 of period t is a stopping rule,   st , that says if search should stop or continue, 
for every search cost, and sequence of observations. A consumer's payoff is the sum of expected period surpluses, 
net of the search expenditure. 
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(c) Firms 
 There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral firms5. 
 Marginal costs are constant, and can be low,   cl , or high,   ch , where   0 £ cl < ch < +¥ . In period 1 a firm has 
marginal cost   cl  with probability   
m Î 0, 1( ). In period 2, a firm that had cost   ci  in period 1 has cost   cs  with probability 
  vis    
i, s = l, h( ). A period 1 low cost firm is more likely to have a low cost in period 2, than a period 1 high cost firm, 
  vhl < vll , i.e., costs are positively correlated across periods. The probability of a firm having a low cost in period 2 is 
  
m := mvll + 1 - m( )vhl . The cost distribution is the same in both periods, i.e.,   m = m . In each period, each firm observes 
only its cost level, before choosing choose prices. I assume that the realized value of a random variable equals its 
expectation. 
 The period t price and per consumer profit of a cost   ci  firm are   pti  and   
p ( p ti ; c i ) := p ti - c i( )D( p ti ) . Let 
  
) 
p i := argmax p  p( p; ci ) . I assume that   p (.) is strictly quasi-concave in p, and that high cost firms lose money if they 
charge   
) 
p l , i.e.,   
) 
p l < ch . See footnote 10 for additional comments. The period t expected consumer share and 
expected profit of a cost   ci  firm are   j t(pti ) and   Pt( pti ; ci) := p( pti ; ci)j t( pti) . The sum of the expected period 
profits of a period 1 cost   ci  firm is    
V i :=P1 ( p1 i ; ci ) + vilP2 ( p2l ; cl) +visP2 ( p2h; ch )[ ]. 
 In either period, the maximum price consumers are willing to pay is lower than   
) 
p h . If a firm charges a price 
higher than the maximum consumers are willing to pay, the firm is Inactive; otherwise it is Active. When indifferent 
between being active and inactive, a firm chooses the latter, and that consumers know if a firm is inactive without 
searching. The measure of period t active firms is   nt . 
 A firm’s period t information set consists of its previous prices, costs, and consumer share realizations. A 
firm’s stage 1 strategy for period t is a rule that for every possible history, say which price a firm should charge. A 
firm's payoff is the sum of the expected period profit. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 I could include a stage 0 where firms decide if they enter the market, for which they would have to pay a set-up cost, and normalize the measure of firms that enter to 1. 
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(d) Equilibrium 
 An equilibrium is: a stopping rule for each period, consumer beliefs, and a pricing rule for each period and 
cost type, 
  
s t
* , Ft* , H *, pti* t = 1, 2; i= l ,h{ }, such that6: 
(E1) Given 
  
Ft*, H *{ } consumers choose   st*  to maximize the net sum of the expected surpluses; 
(E2) Given   st
*  and   ci , firms choose   pti
*  to solve the problem: 
  
max{p1i ,p2i }V
i ; 
(E3) Beliefs 
  
Ft
*, H *{ } agree with the price distributions induced by   pti* , m  and   vis . 
 
3 Characterization of Equilibrium 
 In this section I construct the equilibrium by working backwards. The consumers' equilibrium search behavior 
consists of holding reservation prices. Low cost firms are always active and charge their monopoly price. High cost firms, 
in either period, are sometimes active others inactive; when active, high cost firms charge the minimum of the period 
reservation price and their monopoly price. 
 
3.1 Second Period 
3.1.1 Second Stage: The Search Game  
  In this sub-section I characterize period 2’s search equilibrium. 
 In period 2, if consumers search, their optimal strategy consists of holding a reservation price,   r2 , that equates the 
expected marginal benefit to the search cost7,8,9: 
  
  
S(p) -S(r2 )[ ]dF2(p)p
2
r 2ò = s          (1) 
Inspection of (1) and implicit differentiation lead to the next result stated without proof. 
 
Lemma 1: (i) For all   s > 0 ,   p 2 < r2 ; (ii)   r2  is increasing in s , and in first order stochastic dominance shifts in the 
price distribution10.           § 
                                                 
6 Equilibrium requires also restrictions on the consumers’ beliefs about the price distribution. See Pereira (2001). 
7 See Reinganum (1979) or Benabou (1993). Given (A.2) consumers optimize with respect to beliefs, which given (A.3) do not depend on observed prices. Thus, the consumers' 
search problem can be solved through dynamic programming. 
8 The usual assumption to ensure that search occurs, is that consumers get the first price quote for free. An alternative is for the search cost to be “small enough”. 
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 From Lemma 1: (i) costly search gives firms market power, since it leads consumers to accept prices above the 
minimum charged in the market. Also,   n2 > 0 . 
3.1.2 First Stage: The Pricing Game 
 In this sub-section I characterize period 2’s equilibrium prices. 
 The measure of consumers searching in period 2, i.e., consumers that in period 1 patronized a firm inactive in 
period 2, is   DC . If a firm charges a price higher than   r2  it makes no sales; if it charges a price no higher than   r2  it keeps 
its period 1 consumers   j1 , and gets an expected consumer share of   DC/n2 . Thus: 
  
  
j2( p) =
0                  Ü   r2 < p
j1 + DC / n2  Ü   p£ r2
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
 
Lemma 2: (i)   p2l
* = ) p l ; (ii) 
  
  
p2 h
* =
r2                   Ü   ch £ r2
¢ p 2 Î r2 , +¥( )  Ü   r2 < ch
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
              § 
 
 Since low cost firms charge the lowest price, and given Lemma 1: (i), they are never constrained by consumer 
search and always charge their monopoly price. High cost firms also benefit from the market power generated by costly 
search, by charging a higher price than low cost firms. They are, nevertheless, disciplined by consumer search. If the 
reservation price is high, i.e.,   ch £ r2 , high cost firms charge the reservation price. If the reservation price is low, i.e., 
  r2 < ch , high cost firms are inactive11. From Lemma 2: 
  
  
n2 =
1   Ü   ch £ r2
m  Ü   r2 < ch
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
 
3.2 First Period 
3.2.1 Second Stage: The Search Game  
 In this sub-section I characterize the period 1 equilibrium search. 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 As it will become clear in Sub-Section 3.1.2 , on the equilibrium path, consumers that patronized in period 1 a firm that has a low cost in period 2, do not search. However, if they 
did, would they hold the same reservation price as consumers that patronized in period 1 a firm that has a high cost in period 2? In other words, is the optimal strategy for sequential 
search with recall stationary? The answer is yes (DeGroot (1970), Kohn & Shavell (1974), or Yahav (1966)). 
10 Distribution F(.) dominates in the first-order stochastic sense distribution F’(.), if   F(.)£ ¢ F (.) , for all p. 
11 If   ch £
) 
p l , high cost firms are always active in period 2, whereas if   
) 
p l < ch , they may or may not, depending on   r2 , i.e., case   
) 
p l < ch  encompasses case   ch £
) 
p l . 
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 Period 2’s net maximum expected surplus of a consumer who's best available offer in period 1 is p and behaves 
optimally is   G( p ) . In Pereira (2001), I show that in period 1, if consumers search, their optimal period 1 strategy consists 
of holding a reservation price,   r1 , that equates the sum of the expected marginal benefit of search for periods 1 and 2, to 
the search cost12: 
  
  
S(p) -S(r1 )[ ]dF1 (p) + G(p) -G(r1)[ ]dF1(p)
p
1
r1
ò
p
1
r 1
ò = s       (2) 
Consumers learn for free the period 2 price of their period 1 supplier. Thus, they tend to buy at the same firm in both 
periods. With the prospect of buying twice from the same firm, the consumers’ period 1 incentives to search depend on 
current savings, 
  
S(p) - S( r1 )[ ], and also on future savings,   G(p) - G( r1 )[ ]. As before,   n1 > 0 . 
 
3.2.2 First Stage: The Pricing Game 
 In this sub-section I characterize period 1’s equilibrium prices. 
 The period 1 expected consumer share of a firm that charges p is: 
  
  
j1(p) =
0       Ü   r1 < p
1/ n1  Ü   p £ r1
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
To ensure that high cost firms are active in period 1, let: 
  
0 £ p () p l ,ch ) + nhlp(
) 
p l ,cl )+ 1- nhl( )p () p h ,ch )[ ].13 
 
Lemma 3: (i)   p1l
* =
) 
p l ; (ii)   p1h
* = rl           § 
 
 Due to the lock-in effect, even if a firm charges a price acceptable to consumers in period 2, it will only sell either 
to its period 1 customers, or to consumers that are searching. Thus, when the reservation price falls below the high cost 
level,   r1 < ch , a high cost firm sells below marginal cost in period 1, but secures a larger consumer share for period 2. 
From Lemma 3:   n1 = 1 and 
  
  
DC =
0         Ü   ch £ r2
1- m( )  Ü   r2 < ch  
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
                                                 
12 If   S(.) + G (.)  is monotonic the optimal acceptance set is connected, and the optimal strategy has the reservation price property. To determine if   G (.)  is monotonic one ought to 
know   H (.) . However, I show in Pereira (2001) that   G (.)  is non-increasing for   
) 
p l £ p . 
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4 Price Dynamics and Shakeout 
 In this section I discuss price dynamics. 
 I start by establishing some useful expressions and results about the reservation prices. 
 Using Lemma 2, (1) can be written as: 
  
  
m S() p l ) -S(r2 )[ ]- s = 0  Ü   ch £ r2
  S(
) 
p l) -S(r2)[ ]- s = 0  Ü  r2 < ch  
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï
        (4) 
From Lemmas 2 and 3, and the definition of   vil ,   G( p1l ) = v ll S(
) 
p l ) + 1 - v ll( )S( p 2 ) ,   G( p ¹ p1l) = vhlS( ) p l) +  
  
1 - vhl( )S( p 2 ) , and thus: 
  
  
G( p1l )- G(p) = v ll - vhl( )S( ) p l ) - S( p 2 )[ ]       (5) 
Let 
  
v(s,m, vll ,vhl ) := 1- vll - vhl( )M[ ]s  where 
  
  
M =
1  Ü   ch £ r2
m  Ü   r2 < ch
ì 
í 
ï 
î ï 
 
Assume that 
  
vll - vhl( )< m < 1/ v ll + vhh( ). The first inequality ensures that   0 <v(s, m, vll ,vhl ) , and the second 
simplifies exposition14. Using Lemma 3 and (5), (2) can be written as: 
  
  
m S(
) 
p l )- S(r1 )[ ]+ ( nll - nhl ) S() p l) - S(r2 )[ ]{ }- s = 0  
or using (4) and   v(s,m, vll ,vhl ) , as: 
  
  
m S(
) 
p l ) -S(r1)[ ]- v(s,v ll ,vhl ) = 0         (6) 
 
Proposition 1: (i)   ch £ r2  Þ    r1 < r2 ; (ii)   r2 < ch  Þ    r2 < r1 .      § 
 
 Since period 1’s costs are positively correlated with period 2’s costs, period 1’s costs are informative of 
period 2’s costs. And, since high cost firms charge higher prices than low cost firms, period 1’s prices are also 
informative of period 2’s prices. 
                                                                                                                                                    
13 Under the alternative assumption, a high cost firm becomes inactive in period 1 if   r1  is low enough, and there is a level of   r1  for which a high cost firm is indifferent between 
being active and inactive in period 1,   ps . The analysis in  this paper corresponds to case   ps £r1 . See Pereira (2001) for the alternative case. 
14  
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 Consumers tend to buy at the same firm in both periods, and period 1’s prices are informative of period 2’s 
prices. If in period 2 high cost firms are active, in period 1 consumers conduct a more thorough search than they 
would for a single purchase. That is, in period 1 consumers hold a lower reservation price than in period 2,   r1 < r2 . If, 
however, in period 2 high cost firms are inactive, consumers face lower prices in period 2 than in period 1, and 
therefore, hold a lower reservation price in period 2 than in period 1,   r2 < r1 . 
 Next I establish the results about price dynamics. 
 
Proposition 2: (i)   ch £ r2  Þ    F2
*  first order stochastically dominates   F1
* ; (ii)   r2 < ch  Þ    F1
*  first order 
stochastically dominates   F2
* .          § 
 
 If high cost firms are active in period 2, since in period 1 the reservation price is lower than in period 2, 
  r1 < r2 , prices increase from period 1 to period 2. If high cost firms are inactive in period 2, prices decrease from 
period 1 to period 2. The number of inactive firms in period 2 is non-decreasing in the search cost and decreasing in 
the probability of a firm having a low cost in period 1. 
 In short, since there are switching costs that lock-in consumers, firms are prepared to initially charge very low 
prices to build a customer base for the future, where they hope to have low costs. If however firms fail to reduce 
costs, and reservations prices are low, firms exit the industry. Over time, prices increase, if no exit occurs, and 
decrease, if exit occurs. 
 In this model, high cost firms can charge prices below marginal cost in period 1, and by doing so, earn higher 
profits in period 2. But the period 1 high cost firms’ purpose is not to expel rivals, but rather to build a customer base 
for period 2, which is necessary, since due to the lock-in consumers do not move freely between firms. Thus, below 
marginal cost pricing need not a sign predatory behavior (Bagwell, Ramey & Spulber (1997)) 
 
5 Generalizations and Qualifications 
 In Pereira (2001), I extend the model to the cases of: infinite horizon, continuum of cost types, endogenous 
cost distribution, and where it is costly to observe the current price of a previous supplier. I allow also costs to be 
uncorrelated across period, and high cost firms to be inactive in period 1. 
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 Uncorrelated costs allow prices to remain flat over time, and many cost types allow prices to increase over 
time even when exit occurs. 
 
Appendix 
 In the appendix I prove the text’s Lemmas  and Propositions . 
Lemma 2: (i) I proceed in 3 steps. In step 1 I show that 
  
p
2
= p2l* £ p2 h* = p 2 . Suppose that   p2h
* < p2l* . By 
definition:   P (p2h
* ; r2 ,c l) £ P(p2l* ; r2 , cl)  and   P (p2l
* ; r2 , ch ) £ P (p2h* ; r2 ,ch ) . Adding the inequalities one gets 
  
0 £ ch - cl( )D( p2 l* )j2 ( p2l* ) -D(p2h* )j2( p2h* )[ ], which is false if   p2h* < p2l* , since   j2( .)  is non-increasing and   D(.)  is 
strictly decreasing. Thus   p2l
* £ p2h* . In step 2 I show that   p2l
* < r2 . Follows from step 1 and Lemma 1: (i). In step 3 I 
show that   pl2
* =
) 
p l . Given step 2 and the definition of   j2( .) , from the   cl  firms' perspective,   j2( p2l)  is given. Thus, 
only   p (.) matters to determine   p2l
* . Suppose   p2l
* ¹
) 
p l . Consider first   p2l
* <
) 
p l . There is a   e >0  sufficiently small 
such that   p2l
* +e < r2 . Thus, if a   cl  firm deviates and charges   p2l
* + e , it loses no customers, and by strict quasi-
concavity of   p (.) rises. Thus,   
) 
p l £ p2l
* . Now suppose,   
) 
p l < p2l
* . If a   cl  firm deviates and charges   p2l =
) 
p l , given 
(A.3), and by definition   
) 
p l  profit rises. Thus,   p2l
* £
) 
p l , and therefore,   p2l
* =
) 
p l . (ii) Consider first   ch < r2 . Suppose 
  p2h < r2 . If a   ch  firm charges   p2h
* = r2 , it loses no customers, and   p (.) rises, as in step 3 of (i). Suppose   r2 < p2h . A 
  ch  firm charges makes no sales, whereas if   p2h
* = r2 , it has a strictly positive profit. It follows that   p2h
* = r2  for 
  ch < r2 . If   r2 < ch ,   ch  firms make zero profits for any   ¢ p 2 Î r2 , +¥( ); otherwise they make a negative profit. § 
 
Lemma 3: (i)-(ii) As in Lemma 1.          § 
 
Proposition 1: (i)-(ii) Follow from (4) and (6). (iii) By the implicit differentiation of (4) and (6).  § 
 
Proposition 2: (i)-(ii) Follow from   m = m , Lemmas 2 and 3, and Proposition 1.    § 
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